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Abstract 
In June 2014, the Kenyan coastal town of Mpeketoni was the target of a brutal and prolonged 
terrorist attack, in which dozens of civilians were murdered. In the aftermath of the attack, there 
were apparently widely differing analyses of its nature and purpose. After a delay, the Somali-based 
al Shabaab movement claimed responsibility. However, the government of Kenya insisted that it had 
actually been the result of ‘local politics’ – thought it was not clear whether that referred to politics 
on this part of the coast, or to the tense national politics of confrontation between the ruling Jubilee 
coalition and the opposition CORD. The ambiguities of this moment of violence provide a revealing 
window on the complex relationships between developments in Islam at the coast and in Kenya 
more widely, the coast’s place in wider movements of political Islam, and patterns of secular 
grievance and political ambition which also drive violence. This paper will argue that the intersection 
of multiple factors makes the Kenya coast particularly volatile. The weakness of the Kenyan state has 
provided a favourable environment for acts of terror; equally importantly, Kenya’s national politics 
have normalized and vulgarized violence. 
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7 
Introduction 
 
On the evening of June 15 2014, the small town of Mpeketoni, a few miles inland from the northern 
Kenyan coast, was overrun by a group of armed attackers. The attackers were apparently well-
organized and confident of their ability to handle the security forces. Over the course of several 
hours they burned vehicles, banks and shops and murdered some fifty people.1 During the course of 
the attack, they shouted slogans which suggested that they were linked to the Somali al-Shabaab 
movement; according to some accounts they systematically selected non-Muslim men for murder. 
When a claim of responsibility was finally made by al-Shabaab some hours later, it announced the 
attack both as retaliation for the involvement of Kenyan forces in Somalia, and as revenge for the 
murders of Muslim preachers in Mombasa (which were widely assumed to be the work of the 
Kenyan security forces).2 The announcement also described Mpeketoni as a town of ‘Christian 
settlers’ who had displaced the original Muslim inhabitants of the area – a reference to the 
predominance in and around the town of Kenyans from the Kikuyu ethnic group, who have taken up 
land in a settlement scheme there since the 1970s.  
 
The interpretation of the attack immediately became politically contested. Internationally, it was 
immediately seen as another incident in a spiralling succession of attacks by radical Muslim 
terrorists. However, the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta,  announced that it was the result of 
‘local political networks’.3 This was taken by some to be a direct accusation against opposition leader 
Raila Odinga, who had been calling for mass rallies to force the government into a national 
dialogue.4 It could also, however, be interpreted as an accusation that politicians on the coast (and 
particularly in Lamu County, in which Mpeketoni lies) had been mobilizing voters along ethnic lines  
by stirring up land grievances. Kenyatta’s remarks also served as an implicit rebuff to Kenya’s long-
term allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, whose relationships with the current 
government in Kenya are strained: they had been quick to identify the attacks as the work of al-
Shabaab.5 In the wake of a second attack two weeks, later, a senior police officer definitively 
announced that this was the work not of al-Shabaab but of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), 
a coastal movement which seeks secession; that statement has not been retracted, though 
subsequent announcements by other police officers have directly connected the attacks to al 
Shabaab.6   
                                                          
1
 ‘Mpeketoni attacks death toll rises to 48’, Daily Nation, 16 June 2014, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvgz/-/  
2
 ‘Al Shabaab claims responsibility for Mpeketoni attacks’, Standard Digital, 16 June 2014 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000124978/al-shabaab-claim-responsibility-for-
mpeketoni-attack  
3
 ‘Uhuru blames massacre on tribalism, hate politics’, Daily Nation, 17 June 2014, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-blames-massacre-on-tribalism--hate-politics/-/1056/2352306/-
/wyy1laz/-/index.html  
4
 ‘Mpeketoni attack fits into developing scenario blaming CORD for targeting the Kikuyu’, Daily Nation, 17 June 
2014, http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/Mpeketoni-attack-opposition-kikuyu-/-/1949942/2352388/-
/format/xhtml/-/1v1dn7/-/index.html  
5
 ‘US condemns al Shabaab terrorist attacks on Mpeketoni’, 16 June 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/227645.htm  
6
 ‘Hindi, Gamba attacks work of MRC – Kaindi’, The Star, 6 July 2014, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-
174691/hindigamba-attacks-work-mrc-kaindi ; cf ‘Westgate, Mpeketoni killings suspects held’, The Star, 29 
July 2014, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-180630/westgate-mpeketoni-killings-suspects-held,  
 
 
 
8 
These very divergent interpretations offer a useful reminder that the categorization of violence – as 
‘political’, ‘local’, or ‘terrorist’ – can itself be a technique of power, as can the attribution or claiming 
of specific acts of violence. As will be suggested below, such categorizations are anyway problematic 
because they imply a clarity and singularity of purpose, and a degree of organizational coherence, 
which do not always exist. There are discernibly different strands in the recent history of violence at 
the coast; differentiated sometimes by apparent ideology and rhetoric, but also by the precise 
nature of the violence,  in terms of weapons, organization and targets.   The Mpeketoni attack seems 
to signal the increasingly close interweaving of some of these strands. This interweaving has, 
ironically, been enabled and perhaps even encouraged by the chronic failings of the Kenyan state’s 
security sector, as well as by a wider pattern of the instrumentalization of ethnic violence which has 
been a feature of Kenyan politics since the 1990s.  It is a profoundly alarming development. 
 
 
Struggles over Islam on the Kenya coast 
 
Kenya’s coast is in itself a contested imaginary. For some, ‘the coast’ means the towns of the 
shoreline and the narrow strip of land around them; it is an urban, maritime landscape, dominated 
by the city of Mombasa. For others, the coast includes a broader band running along the coast, 
much of it rural; and for others again it means what was until 2010 the Coast Province, which in 
places stretched far inland. Those different geographical imaginaries evoke different ideas of culture 
and identity.  The major towns of the shoreline have a strongly Muslim feel to them, though they  
have very diverse populations. South of Mombasa, the local hinterland of the coast is largely 
populated by Muslims– the largest ethnic group  being Digo, part of the larger group now known as 
the Mijikenda who often present themselves as the autochthonous African population of the coast. 
Further inland, and on the coast north of Mombasa,  are other Mijikenda, mostly either Christian or 
following traditional systems of belief. The band of territory along Kenya’s coastline is also now 
home to many Kenyans whose ancestors come from other parts of the country; while some are 
Muslim, the majority are not (Sperling, 2000).   It is possible that the Coast Province actually had a 
slight Christian majority.7 However ‘the coast’ is defined, Islam has a much longer history there than 
does Christianity, and retains a degree of cultural pre-eminence; but by no means all see ‘the coast’ 
as synonymous with Islam. 
 
There are a small number of Shi’a Muslims on the coast. Some belong to small Asian communities 
which maintain a distinct religious life of their own, others are more recent Ithna-asheri converts, 
the result of proselytization funded by donors in Kuwait. But the Muslim population is very largely 
Sunni, and that population has always been engaged with a wider Muslim world across the Indian 
Ocean (Lodhi, 1994). There have been Muslims on the coast for well over a thousand years, and 
practice and ideas of piety share much with other parts of that Indian Ocean world. As elsewhere in 
Africa, there is a history of syncretism, and of forms of religion which are often called Sufi (Cruise 
O’Brien, 1981). On the Kenya coast, ‘Sufism’ has existed largely as a bundle of local practices and 
assumptions – the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, the performance of dhikri, a congregational 
salutation at the end of prayer, a belief in the efficacy of prayers to local saints. Sufi brotherhoods 
have had little or no organizational power, and there has been no charismatic leader exercising 
                                                          
7
 ‘Ambassador Bellamy visits Coast Province’, 1 March 2006, 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06NAIROBI919_a.html, viewed 16 Mar. 2014. 
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widespread influence, with the brief and partial exception of Habib Swaleh, a sharif and scholar who 
had considerable impact on Lamu, on what is now the northern Kenya coast, in the late nineteenth 
century (Thordsen, 2009: 12). Among some higher status groups – the well-educated, or those who 
claim to be sharifs – there are very local networks centred on regular readings and mosque 
discussions, involving the Maulidi ya Burdai, a Swahili text. Such groups may explicitly consider 
themselves to be pursuing tasawwuf; but they do not have wide influence or reach.   This is in 
contrast to what is now Tanzania, to the south, where the Qadiriyya order both propelled the spread 
of Islam and provided a degree of leadership for a time in the early twentieth century (Martin, 
1969).  
 
Kenya’s coast also has a history of the periodic disruptive arrival of practices from elsewhere in the 
Indian Ocean which challenged existing behaviours or notions of piety and social hierarchy. Habib 
Swaleh himself exemplified this; so too, in a different way, did the reformist scholar Al-Amin Mazrui 
in the 1930s (Pouwels, 1981).  Engaging with wider ideas about Islam has repeatedly provided a way 
for people – especially men – to talk about projects of social reform, and to wind ideas about proper 
religious practice together with wider agendas. From the 1960s, teachers and finance from a range 
of sources – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan – encouraged a growing criticism of practices of 
‘innovation’, or bid’a (Haynes, 2006: 499-500; Kresse, 2009: 577-78). Men who had studied in Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan or elsewhere returned to the coast, and their claims to scholarship gave them status 
and influence as imams and teachers. Their criticism of innovatory religious practice could be tied 
together with denunciations of superstition and the social dominance of men who claimed an 
inherited ability to dispense blessings. This has been a running source of tension and an occasional 
trigger of local, though usually non-lethal, violence. Over time, some practices – the Maulid, the 
salutation to the congregation, the offering of intercessory prayers for the dead - have diminished as 
a result.   
 
It would be easy to characterize this as one more example of a wider contest between foreign-
funded ‘Islamists’ and ‘African’ Sufis which has been identified across the continent in recent 
decades (Cruise O’Brien, 1981; Rosander, 1997; Westerlund, 1997). That analysis has become 
influential in recent thinking about counter-terrorism, which views ‘temperate, progressive’ Sufis as 
‘moderates’ who are potential allies of the United States (MacCormack, 2005: 2; Rabasa, 2007: 25-
26, 77). Set against the Sufis, in this view, are those who are both Islamists – advocating a political 
agenda based on Islam – and Salafists, having a particular doctrinal view which denounces 
innovation in religious practices. Some argue that the work of international Islamic NGOs has tended 
to support the Islamists (Hunwick, 1997; Salih, 2002). These Islamist/Salafists are, in this view, the 
basis of radicalism and violence, and this categorization has informed US and allied attempts to offer 
financial and other support to Sufis. It has also encouraged some to argue that, because Sufi 
practices are still predominant, Kenya is defended from ‘radicalization’ by this profound and 
moderate Sufism which resists the influence of ‘puritanical Salafists’ (Vittori et al, 2009: 1085). 
 
Useful as a shorthand, that analysis may sometimes be misleading in detail (Thordsen, 2009: 17). 
Radical exponents of violent jihad may well be Salafist in their doctrinal views: Abubakar Shariff, a 
notoriously radical preacher, was known as Makaburi – ‘graves’ – because of his violent opposition 
to the practice of praying at the tombs of saints. Yet to simply equate Salafism and violence, or 
Sufism and political moderation, is mistaken. Many of those who might be called Salafists are quick 
to deny involvement in violence, and to argue that the injunction to treat Islam as a comprehensive 
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approach to life is compatible with involvement in democratic processes. In the relatively recent past 
in eastern Africa, Sufism has provided a basis for violent resistance to European colonial rule; there 
is nothing inherently ‘moderate’ about Sufism (Martin, 1969). Perhaps more importantly, these 
categories are not absolute.  On the Kenya coast, those who might variously call themselves Salafists 
or modernizers or Islamists are by no means a united body; not all Salafists are radical critics of the 
Kenyan political system. Externally-funded religious propaganda with what might be called an 
Islamist message has not always been ‘Salafist’. From the 1980s, Iranian religious propaganda was 
also disseminated on the coast (Lacunza Baldo, 1993, 1997: Kresse, 2009: 585-6). Nor is there any 
leadership or single organization for ‘Sufis’. Particular mosques may have reputations as Salafist, and 
sometimes that is combined with  reputation for preaching which is violently radical in tone and 
explicitly espouses the use of violence. There are in some places loose groupings of ‘tariqa mosques’, 
where certain practices associated with Sufism are more likely; in the last few years it might be 
argued that some of these practices have made a modest revival, to some extent propelled by 
external support for such mosques provided through ‘anti-radicalization’ schemes. But these 
affiliations are not absolute or enduring. It is preachers, rather than mosques, which matter. Since 
mosques are largely autonomous, loosely governed by committees or sometimes simply in the 
hands of an individual, radical preachers can gain access to many mosques. Nor do ‘tariqa mosques’ 
always eschew political discussion in favour of quietist, devotional Islam – they too may be places for 
explicit discussion over the status of the Muslim community locally, and internationally.  
 
Debates over innovation intersect in unpredictable ways with other rifts. One of these is racial. The 
position of coastal Islam on the periphery of the Indian Ocean world has long encouraged an 
extraversion in which external links are prized. Claims to Arab or Persian ancestry have been a 
marker of high status; African Muslims, especially those whose families have become Muslim only 
recently, have been correspondingly seen as lower in status (Constantin, 1993, 39-40; Macintosh, 
2009). African Muslims may also be divided – between those who see themselves as coastal 
indigenes and those whose families have come to the coast more recently from other parts of 
Kenya. Amongst those who claim to be Arabs, there are other hierarchies, with Omani families 
linked to the former sultanate of Zanzibar seeing themselves as a particular elite, but with other 
groups – like the highly mobile sharifian families from the Hadhramaut  - also claiming a special 
status. These social fault lines offer points of purchase for those who wish to pursue projects of 
Islamic reform or radicalism, but there is no clear and consistent pattern. While Rabasa (2009: 36) 
has argued that the ‘general orientation of...non-Arab Muslims creates a brake on the spread of 
radical Islam among non-Arab upcountry Muslims’, there is little evidence for this. Recent converts 
to Islam from ‘up-country’ may be enthusiastic Salafists or may attend ‘tariqa mosques’;  Arab 
Muslims from high-status families may be convinced of their own inherited power to bestow 
blessings, but they may also denounce the very idea of such blessing. Race, ethnicity, and attitudes 
to devotion all cross-cut in unpredictable ways with ideas about the place of Islam in politics. These 
multiple divisions lie behind the consistent absence of any clear Muslim leadership which Constantin 
(1993) identified as a feature of Kenyan Islam (also Ndzovu, 2012: 30-34).   
 
A commitment to the violent promotion of Islam is not, then, a straightforward result of Salafists 
displacing Sufis. Yet if we take ‘Islamism’ to mean a close sense of the political implications of belief, 
and a questioning of the notion of a secular divide between religion and politics, this attitude has 
become widespread.  The continued debates over the nature of devotional practice   have ensured a 
continued engagement with wider debates in Islam which has itself promoted this attitude; and in 
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the last two decades the intensity and range of that engagement has increased very substantially, 
both because of regional and international circumstances and because of the dramatic new 
possibilities of technology - whether one views this as an ‘Islamic resurgence’ or as evidence that 
Islam simply provides an associational basis for political action (Thordsen, 2009: 14, 19, 55-56). This 
growing engagement with a wider – often virtual – community of Muslims has been closely 
associated with a sense of marginalization within Kenya, and with a willingness to see that local 
Kenyan circumstance as one manifestation of an international subordination of Islam. 
 
As Kai Kresse has noted, coastal Muslims’ marginal status in the Indian Ocean world is echoed and 
redoubled by their relationship with the rest of Kenya (Kresse, 2009). Kenya is nominally secular, but 
– as Donal Cruise O’Brien and others have argued – it is in practice a Christian state, its political 
culture infused with Christian language and imagery (Cruise O’Brien, 2003; Thordsen, 2009: 35-7)). 
Since independence Kenya’s political and administrative elite have been overwhelmingly Christian. 
While recent years have seen slightly more participation at senior levels by Muslims, that has been 
of little significance compared with a contrary trend, a profound pentecostalization of national 
politics that has gathered pace since 2008 (Deacon and Lynch, 2013). Politicians speak at churches; 
political rallies become prayer meetings; clergymen bless candidates for office, and incumbents; 
election winners insist that God chose them to win. While Muslims occasionally play a minor role in 
some of these public events, the tone is overwhelmingly that of Pentecostal Christianity – a 
Christianity which is at time overtly hostile to Islam (Gifford, 2009). 
 
That hostility to Islam sometimes finds a focus in Kenya’s most intimate enemy: its own population 
of ethnic Somalis. Kenya was born in an existential conflict with Somalia: the Somali claim to north-
eastern Kenya, largely populated by ethnic Somalis, was a threat to the very idea of a Kenya which 
was defined by its colonial borders. Kenya’s ‘Shifta’ war, against insurgents who aimed at secession, 
lasted for several years (Whittaker, 2008). Brutal tactics left a bitter legacy, with Kenya’s Somali 
citizens resentful at their mistreatment by the government, and mistrusted  by other Kenyans. In the 
1990s this relationship took on a new intensity with the arrival in Kenya of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the conflict in Somalia. Some were settled in huge camps; many others sought to 
make a living in other parts of Kenya, notably in the Nairobi support of Eastleigh (Murunga, 2009). 
The Somali population of Mombasa also grew significantly. The status and rights of these refugees 
were uncertain: occasional attempts to confine them to camps failed, and the state struggled – 
largely unsuccessfully – to distinguish between refugees and citizens. Meanwhile, some other 
Kenyans came to resent this new Somali population – particularly in Nairobi, where they formed a 
highly entrepreneurial community, competing successfully for control of urban real estate and other 
businesses (Abdelsamed, 2011). In continuing and close contact with family and clan in Somalia, this 
population has also inevitably been affected by – and involved in – the violent politics of Somalia. 
Some have been bitter enemies of Islamists in Somalia; others have shared the vision of radical Islam 
as the cure for Somalia’s ills, and the idea that Somalia is a battleground between the ‘crusader’ 
forces of the west and Islam. A continued history of violent repression by the Kenyan security forces 
has made the relationship between Somalis and Kenya every more problematic (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). 
 
Those debates over Islam among Kenya’s Somali population have in turn become entwined with a 
developing politics over the status of Islam in Kenya. The coast was initially the focus for this politics, 
but one of its features has been a prolonged debate over who has the right to speak for Muslims in 
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Kenya, in which one largely unmentioned but evident line of tension has been between the 
competing claims to leadership of men from the Kenya coast and Somali men.  
 
A distinctively Muslim political agenda was first – and briefly – articulated in Kenya in the early 
1960s, just before independence, when some called for the coast to become either a separate state, 
or to be united with Zanzibar under the rule of the then sultan. The language of this claim – largely 
pressed by Arabs - could be distinctively Islamic, though it was rooted in a legal oddity: nineteenth-
century treaties meant that a ten-mile strip of land along Kenya’s coast was nominally the territory 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and not part of Kenya Colony (Brennan, 2008). Attracting little support 
from a wider coastal population – many of whom viewed this as an attempt by Arabs to maintain 
their political and economic dominance - this campaign was entirely unsuccessful. The coast become 
part of Kenya; but echoes of this political moment still occasionally reverberate. After independence, 
there was almost no public Muslim politics for almost thirty years. The Supreme Council of Kenya 
Muslims (SUPKEM), like similar organizations elsewhere, was closely allied to the government. 
(Haynes, 2006: 492). When new legislation in the 1980s seemed to conflict with Muslim precepts of 
family law, SUPKEM preferred to pursue a back-door politics of lobbying (Ndzovu, 2009).  
 
Against this background, the emergence of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1992 seemed a 
dramatic new departure (Oded, 2000). The IPK was never registered, and its political strategy was 
inconsistent, partly because of a leadership dispute which – characteristically – followed ethnic and 
racial lines. But it created an entirely new phenomenon of Muslim street protest – notably on the 
coast, which was where its real strength lay (Kresse, 2009: 584). IPK’s public pronouncements always 
stressed that it was a national party, and that its agenda was primarily one of political reform: 
despite their differences, its leaders all sought to seize the moment of Kenya’s return to multi-
partyism to present Muslim concerns as synonymous with a wider agenda of political and social 
reform (Ndzovu, 2012: 27).8 In doing so, they articulated a connected set of grievances: that Muslims 
suffered discrimination in education and in state employment, that Muslims found it harder to get 
identity papers than did other Kenyans, that they were constantly regarded as outsiders (Haynes, 
2006: 498).  While IPK protests increasingly often involved violence – much of it the work of the 
police, or gangs organized by politicians to attack the IPK – the IPK sought to be a movement of mass 
protest, not a terrorist organization.  
 
The IPK slowly collapsed in the mid-1990s, weakened both by a determined campaign of 
government repression and by the egotism and rivalry of its leaders (Bakari, 1995). But it had set a 
pattern for a new, more assertive politics of Islam (Wandera, 2008-9). It had also demonstrated that 
an overtly religious party could not be legally registered in Kenya – where, despite the effective 
Christian dominance of political life, all parties are nominally required to be secular. In the wake of 
the IPK’s demise, civil society groups took up the role of advocacy for Muslims: notably the Council 
of Imams and preachers (CIPK), founded in 1997, and the Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), 
created in the same year. Both sought to work constitutionally, and argued that advocacy for 
Muslims was indistinguishable from a  wider advocacy for human rights and equality across Kenya.9 
Both were predominantly coastal and, characteristically, other similar organizations emerged 
                                                          
8
 ‘Why is Balala on the warpath?’, Lifestyle section, pp. 2-3, Sunday Nation,  28 Mar. 1993. 
9
 ‘The Council of Imamas and Preachers of Kenya’, 7 April 2010, 
http://islaminafrica.wordpress.com/category/local-islamic-associations-and-organizations/cipk-the-council-of-
imams-and-preachers-of-kenya-c-i-p-k/, viewed 24 July 2014. 
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elsewhere in Kenya, competing for the mantle of leadership (Thordsen, 2009: 44-45). In the long 
debate over constitutional reform in Kenya, which saw two referenda (in 2005 and 2010), a number 
of these organizations were closely involved, and they encouraged Muslim engagement in the 
process (Thordsen, 2009: 47-49). 10 
 
 Meanwhile, others encouraged a very different approach to Muslim politics, on the coast and 
elsewhere in Kenya. The early 1990s had established the potential of mosques as centres of political 
debate and mobilisation. Particularly in the main towns of the coast, a growing population of youth 
with limited economic prospects and a keen sense that they were the direct victims of discrimination 
listened readily to preachers who explained their particular problems as evidence of systematic 
discrimination against Muslims. By the late 1990s, such speakers were increasingly likely to present 
this as an international, not simply a national, struggle; evoking events in Somalia, Palestine or in the 
Gulf. The discontent of many young Muslims encouraged an escalation of the radical content of 
sermons in many mosques: there was a demand for fiery rhetoric.  
 
New technology accelerated this process (Haynes, 2005: 1329). First the circulation of DVDs, and 
then the ever-increasing connectivity of many people at the coast, provided access to a whole new 
genre of films, photographs and speeches, which encouraged Muslims on the coast – and in Kenya 
generally – to see themselves as part of a global struggle.  Not all of this material glorifies violence, 
but some of it does. In recent years, websites run in the name of ‘cyber-sheikhs’ have provided an 
interactive element to this virtual preaching: questioners can seek opinions through these websites, 
some of which readily authorise violence as legitimate jihad. This material is generally unconcerned 
with the specifics of Kenya, and does not call for wider social and political reform in Kenya. It 
universalizes the Muslim condition as one of oppression, and locates the remedy for that oppression 
in a global revolution which will overturn the international system.11 In this rhetoric, capitalism, 
democracy and secularism are identical evils. There is, however, no consensus on what should 
replace this; as in Somalia, radical Muslim voices are by no means united in terms of their goal, 
though they have a common rhetoric of oppositionism (Marchal, 2011: 35-36). Some promote the 
notion of a khalifate; others leave open the possible structure of a world liberated for Islam.  
 
Against this background, organizations like CIPK which have pursued a peaceful engagement in 
Kenyan national politics have struggled. They have received support from external bodies – USAID, 
the Danish government (Lind and Howell, 2008; Ndzovu, 2012: 44). Arguably , this has helped to 
ensure them both a significant role and influence, and has  helped sustain the political engagement 
of Muslims in Kenya’s constitutional debates and process (Thordsen, 2009: 53-54). Yet such support 
has also left them increasingly vulnerable to the criticism that they have compromised, and they 
have found themselves outflanked by more radical voices which use mosques – and the internet – to 
argue that involvement with the democratic process is not only pointless, but actually weakens 
Islam. 
                                                          
10
 ‘It is a big YES for Muslims. Leaders  unite in support for the draft constitution’, The Friday Bulletin, 363, 16 
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For some, then, the sense that Muslims have been marginalized, and that Kenyan Muslim experience 
is simply one aspect of a global pattern of injustice, has provided the justificatory narrative for 
violence. The developing power of this narrative helps explain the changing nature of that violence. 
The East African embassy bombings of 1998 were the work of men trained elsewhere, brought into 
the region for the purpose, and were in some ways remote from local politics in Kenya and Tanzania 
(Shinn, 2007: 65-66). By 2002, this had already begun to change: at the core of the Paradise Hotel 
bombing were members of the original group which had planned the 1998 attacks, but it also 
involved Kenyans (Botha, 2013: 3-5). The Ethiopian invasion that overthrew the Islamic Courts Union 
in Somalia marked a further change (Kfir, 2008). It made the conflict in Somali more easily 
presentable as simple fight for Islam, and propelled al-Shabaab – rather than al-Qaeda – into the role 
of the principal mobilizing force in the region. In Kenya, young men came to be recruited through 
preaching, in a systematic way: members of the congregation who responded strongly to radical 
sermons were identified, and then encouraged to join a small group for more lectures and 
discussions – a pattern of isolating potential recruits which al-Shabaab had already established in 
Somalia (Marchal, 2011: 41).  After a time, such young men could be offered the opportunity – and 
the money – to travel to Somali to train and to fight; by some estimates, ‘hundreds’ took this 
opportunity (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014: 524). Radical preachers, and those who helped 
them, received funds from Somalia, or from sympathizers elsewhere in the world, which supported 
this activity.  
 
Preaching and recruitment were not confined to the Kenya coast. Ahmed Iman Ali, one of the 
followers of Aboud Rogo - the most open and notorious of these preachers – moved to Nairobi to 
pursue a similar strategy, before himself moving to Somalia in 2009 (Anzalone, 2012; Botha, 2013: 7-
9, 10-11; Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014).  There has been a continuing two-way traffic for 
around a decade – varying in scale over time, but constant – with some young men going to receive 
training or fight in Somalia even as others return to the Kenya coast, or to Eastleigh or north-eastern 
Kenya. Of the returnees, some are disillusioned by experience in Somalia; others still see themselves 
as pursuing jihad, and may be receiving some continuing payment.  The Kenyan government’s 
decision to intervene militarily in Somalia in 2011 led to a clear escalation in attacks in Kenya. 
Weapons – including grenades – and ammunition are relatively easy to obtain; high-grade explosives 
apparently less so (since some attacks have used home-made explosive material). As a result, minor 
terrorist incidents  - committed by individuals or small groups, using  grenades, small improvised 
explosive devices, or firearms attacks – have become steadily more common (Nzes, 2012). Until 
recently, however, street protest remained a more common form of political action on the coast – 
though this often turned into attacks on property, and into violent confrontations with the security 
forces.12 
 
The response of the security forces to both terrorism and protest has escalated confrontation. The 
activities of radical preachers became flashpoints for street conflict. When the visiting Jamaican 
preacher Abdullah al Faisal was arrested and deported in 2010, there were violent demonstrations in 
Nairobi and Mombasa; similar demonstrations followed the assassination of Aboud Rogo.13 In 2014, 
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a ‘jihadist’ convention at a Mombasa mosque was publicly advertised; predictably, there was 
considerable violence when this was raided by the police.14 Police tactics in managing street protests 
have been unsophisticated, reliant on indiscriminate use of tear gas and live ammunition.  The Kenya 
police have a poor record in investigating, charging and securing convictions with respect to all forms 
of crime, and are frequently involved in lethal shootings of ‘suspects’(Independent Medico-Legal 
Unit, 2014). The ‘profound weakness’ of Kenya’s security services has been repeatedly identified as a 
factor which enables terrorism (Rosenau, 2005: 4; Shinn, 2007: 64, 67). When arrests are made, 
cases often drag on, partly because of failures in procedure and evidence-gathering. From 2012, 
there was a bitter and intermittent little war of killing and counter-killing underway at the coast, 
punctuated by terrorist attacks (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2013). Suspected radicals were 
murdered, as was one alleged financier of radical preachers; so too were police informers and 
undercover agents, and one prominent Muslim leader, a CIPK official. 15 Another former radical 
preacher was also physically attacked, apparently by youth who denounced him for having become 
less strident in his language; others, including at least one prominent Salafist who was a well-known 
supporter of the Kenyan government, went into hiding.16 By mid-2014, this cycle of murders and 
counter-murders, demonstrations and harsh policing, had generated a climate of widespread 
suspicion and tension at the coast. 
 
 
Coastal secessionism 
 
There are other drivers of violence at the coast. At Kenya’s independence in 1963, while a majority 
of the people at the coast had rejected the idea of secession, there had been substantial support for 
the majimbo  system – that is, for the devolved regional government which existed briefly at the 
time(Prestholdt, 2014; Willis and Gona, 2013). That system was quickly suppressed after 
independence by Jomo Kenyatta’s government, but popular support for some kind of devolution has 
remained strong at the coast, though it was largely unexpressed in the years of single-party rule up 
to 1991. Kenyans have since the 1990s been engaged in a long collective debate over the nature of 
power and inequality in the country. It has been widely argued that a centralizing, authoritarian style 
of government had become entrenched since independence; the return of multi-party politics in the 
early 1990s opened up public space for debate on this, but did not lead to immediate change. One 
draft constitution was put to referendum in 2005, and rejected; another, embodying a substantial 
measure of devolution to a new level of county governments, was approved by referendum in 2010 
(Kimenyi, 2006; Kramon and Posner, 2011). Throughout these debates, popular opinion at the coast 
has generally favoured more devolution.   
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That support has been the corollary of a sometimes violent sense of resentment against people from 
‘up-country’ – and particularly, against Kikuyu, members of Kenyatta’s ethnic group, who were seen 
to have used Kenyatta’s long presidency to acquire land, wealth and power at the expense of coast 
people. As one Mombasa politician put it in the 1980s ‘We Coast people, we lost our own country’ 
(quoted in Wolf, 2000: 132).  Many people at the coast have routinely located their own experience, 
and that of their family and wider kin, in the context of a narrative of marginalization which 
presented coastal people as collective victims – a narrative which was, of course, very similar in 
much of its detail to that of Muslim marginalization. Land has been a particularly explosive issue, 
setting coastal people against one another – notably, Arabs against Mijikenda – but also creating 
increasing tension between coastal people and more recent arrivals from other parts of Kenya. 
Colonial land policy left much land in the coastal strip in the hands of Arab, Asian or European 
landowners, but also left much of it physically occupied by local people – mostly of the group now 
known as Mijikenda – who were technically squatters. While some settlement schemes were 
created, the situation has if anything become worse, as the allocation of land in those schemes was 
widely viewed as unfair (Kanyinga, 1998). People from up-country took up some of the land in 
settlement schemes – in some cases, being given preferential access to these. Some large plots came 
into the hands of members of a new elite from central Kenya; meanwhile, the spread of Mombasa 
and other towns meant made some squatted land into dense peri-urban settlements. Disputes 
between squatters and those who claim to own the land are frequent, occasionally violent, and 
provide a constant reminder of the narrative of coastal dispossession.17 
 
While that narrative could drive constitutional politics, it could also encourage violence. In the 
1990s, as multi-partyism was introduced, some politicians associated with KANU, the then ruling 
party, sought to stir up coastal resentment against ‘up-country’ people at the coast and to call for a 
form of devolved government, or majimbo. This was a piece of cynical opportunism – KANU had 
itself been closely associated with the emergence of the centralized political system, and 
‘devolution’ in this case was simply a cover for a campaign of intimidation to drive out potential 
opposition voters - since by this time, Kikuyu and Luo  were seen as the principal opponents of the 
incumbent president, Daniel arap Moi (Mazrui, 1999). The technique was not confined to the coast: 
indeed, it was used even more dramatically in the Rift Valley, where large numbers of Kikuyu were 
displaced by violent attacks: this period saw the beginning of a diffusion of violence, through which 
politicians deliberately pursued political advantage by organizing gangs to attack the potential 
supporters of their opponents (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 371-84, 541-44). Repeatedly, these 
politicians acted with impunity, even when government-appointed commissions identified those 
believed to be responsible(Akiwumi, 1999; Ndzovu, 2012: 47-48). These attacks corroded state 
authority and legitimacy – indeed, they revealed ‘the state’ to be incoherent and fractionated. They 
also made the violent use of gangs a routine part of politics(Mueller, 2008). At the coast, in the run-
up to the 1992 election, there were isolated acts of violence, and leaflets were distributed 
threatening ‘up-country’ people; in 1997 there was a major outbreak of violence in Mombasa’s 
southern suburb Likoni, where a gang of young men attacked the homes and shops of up-country 
people (Kagwanja, 2001: 88-93). Several dozen people died, and thousands fled (Kresse, 2009: 583; 
Mazrui, 1997). At the coast, this manifested a distinctive style of violence: committed by organized 
groups of young men, with few or no firearms. The ‘training’ of these youths included the 
administering of oaths intended to ensure their loyalty and their courage; these oaths were 
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reportedly administered in kayas, sacred forest areas associated particularly with the Mijikenda: the 
young men involved in the 1997 Mombasa violence came to be known as the ‘Kaya Bombo raiders’, 
because they had allegedly trained and taken oaths in the kaya at Bombo, just south of Mombasa 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002: 37).  
 
Hostility to up-country people was apparent again in 2005-6, at the time of the debate over the draft 
constitution; this time, it took the form of claims that the coast should become independent. The 
argument for this revisited the politics of the early 1960s and the treaties of the late nineteenth 
century. Letters written on behalf of the ‘Republican Council of Mombasa’ argued that ‘the coast’ (a 
term used with intentional vagueness) had never been part of Kenya, and had a legal right to a 
separate status. The argument was flawed, in multiple ways: the treaties had only related to a 
notional ‘ten-mile strip’ which was never mapped or defined, and the Sultan of Zanzibar had 
formally renounced all rights even to that strip in 1963 (Willis and Gona, 2013). But the idea of this 
legal claim to a separate status proved a powerful one, and came to be widely repeated and known. 
By 2011 there was a Facebook page, multiple Youtube videos and various circulating paper 
documents bearing the name of what was now called ‘the Mombasa Republican Council’, or MRC. 
This was not a religious movement. None of the propaganda associated with it made any religious 
arguments or used religious language, and while those most prominently associated with it were 
Muslim men, it apparently had considerable non-Muslim support. 
 
 The men who claimed to be the leaders of the MRC publicly eschewed violence, and declared that 
they would pursue a legal campaign to assert the coast’s independence. How popular the MRC was 
is hard to say; there was much public sympathy among those who considered themselves ‘coast’ 
people, who evidently shared the grievances expressed by the movement. On the other hand, MRC 
rallies were always small if noisy events, and there is no sign that there was widespread support for 
the idea of coastal ‘independence’. Though there were repeated reports of MRC ‘members’ paying 
subscription fees and being organized into a coherent movement , it seems that there was no single 
organization, and the issuing of membership cards and collecting of subscriptions seems to have 
been uncoordinated and opportunistic.18 This was in many ways a very home-made movement, its 
local existence reliant on petty local leaders who sought to leverage an existing degree of local 
influence – as activists, politicians, or sometimes as ritual specialists – into wider authority. Local 
sub-variants of the group seem to have emerged quickly, perhaps in some cases as the result of 
rivalries between aspiring local leaders.19 The rapidity of this localization suggested the levels of 
alienation at the coast; but the process also revealed the persistent racial divide on the coast. Some 
documents circulated in the name of the MRC emphasised the historic claims of ‘the coast’ in terms 
of the treaty, and represented an inclusive idea of the coast; others emphasised the claims of 
‘indigenous’ coast people, and pointedly excluded Arabs (Willis and Gona, 2013).   The MRC call for a 
boycott of the 2013 election was not widely heeded; it seems to have reduced registration, but 
participation was actually higher than in previous elections (Willis and Chome, 2014). Because of the 
diffuse, localized nature of the MRC agitation, the boycott provided opportunity for some local 
overlap with the rhetoric – and supporters – of radical Muslim organizations, which were also 
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denouncing the elections.20 In some parts of Mombasa, graffiti which extolled the MRC and called 
for an election boycott appeared adjacent to graffiti which denounced elections as unIslamic.   
 
Non-violent though the MRC claimed to be, a succession of violent attacks were blamed on its 
supporters in 2012 and 2013. These targeted a practice poll, election meetings, and  police posts.21 
This violence was, in form, quite unlike that associated with Islamic radicalism. Like the ‘kaya raiders’ 
of 1997, these were groups of lightly-armed young men, often only with machetes and bows, who 
relied on numbers to overcome police. In some cases they wore red and blue cloth – traditional 
colours of ritual power among the Mijikenda – and were alleged to have taken oaths. While the 
police alleged that these attacks were evidence that MRC and al-Shabaab were working together, 
these attacks were not claimed by al-Shabaab and were quite different in form to the shootings and 
bomb attacks which al-Shabaab did claim.22 
 
While the men who claimed to lead the MRC insisted that they were not involved, they were 
nonetheless arrested – very violently – and held in prison for a while.23 They have not yet been 
convicted on any charges, though they face continuing court cases. The violence allegedly linked to 
the MRC peaked on the eve of the election itself, when a series of attacks were made on police 
officers and polling stations at the coast in which some nineteen people were killed by attackers 
using machetes and wearing red and blue cloths; in a few places, the poll was heavily disrupted as a 
result (Willis and Chome, 2014: 119). Rumours continue to swirl around this violence, which was 
apparently coordinated and well-organized, and in which groups of armed security officers were 
overwhelmed with surprising ease. The authorities blame the MRC, others have accused land-
owners seeking to undermine the new constitution, or politicians seeking to affect the outcome of 
the election by intimidating voters (Willis and Chome, 2014: 118-19). The nominal leaders of the 
MRC have been largely quiet since the elections, and internet activity has also declined substantially, 
encouraging speculation that at least some of the activity attributed to ‘the MRC’ may have been the 
work of politicians with particular electoral aims. In the aftermath of the Mpeketoni attack, there 
were however claims by police that young men were again being trained and oathed in kayas; five 
young men were arrested in a police raid on one such ‘training’.24 
 
This was not the only violence at the coast in 2012/13 at around the time of the elections. On the 
northern coast, in the area of the Tana delta, more than 100 people were killed in a series of attacks 
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in 2012.25 In these cases too, some of the attacks were apparently well-organized; in one case, nine 
armed security officers were killed by raiders who then went on to murder civilians, burn houses and 
kill livestock. This violence took on a tit-for-tat form, and apparently pitted two ethnic communities 
– both Muslim, and each with a reasonable claim to be ‘indigenous’ to the coast - against one 
another. Again, there were many contending rumours about this violence, which connected it to 
long-term conflicts over land use in an area which is seeing increasing pressure on water and land 
resources, but also to very specific local drivers in terms of  electoral politics.26 This violence was not 
apparently connected to religion, nor was it against ‘up country’ people – but it showed the inability 
of the security forces to prevent or effectively investigate large-scale attacks, and it showed too both 
the tensions which exist around land access at the coast, and the widespread suspicion that 
politicians are able to mobilise violence to pursue their own ends with impunity.27 This is a potent 
combination of circumstances. It creates a sense of insecurity, and deprives the security forces – and 
the state more generally – of credibility; it encourages the emergence of local militias and allows 
those who mobilize violence to present their activities as legitimate. 
 
 
Explaining Mpeketoni 
 
Appearing before a committee of Kenya’s National Assembly, less than a month after the attack on 
Mpeketoni, local political leaders differed dramatically in their explanations. The elected MP for the 
area – who is a Kikuyu, like most of his constituents – accused ‘large landowners’ of organizing the 
attacks; others accused ‘criminals’ or ‘outsiders’.28 The MP also alleged that the county governor of 
Lamu – who had been briefly arrested over the attacks, and who is an Arab – was hostile to his 
constituents; an unsubtle hint that he believed him to be involved.  A few days earlier, the Deputy 
President had implied again that he believed Raila Odinga was responsible for the attacks on the 
coast; and the President Kenyatta continued to insist that the violence was the result of tribalism.29 
The persistence of these alternative narratives, in the face of al-Shabaab’s claims, and in spite of 
reports that most of the attackers spoke Somali, is partly the result of Lamu’s local politics, and of 
Kenyan national politics. Yet it also seems likely that, improbable as they are in some respects, there 
is an element of truth in this narrative: militants associated with al Shabaab have adopted a style of 
violence, and parts of the rhetoric, associated with other kinds of violence at the coast. 
 
The settlement at Mpeketoni was created in the 1970s. Previously sparsely occupied and irregularly 
cultivated by Bajun and other local people, the land had been largely abandoned in the 1960s as a 
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result of the Shifta war. After the end of that conflict, the government had claimed possession of the 
land and made it into a settlement scheme; the majority of plots were apparently allocated to 
Kikuyu. More people moved to the area over time, some buying land rather than having to allocated 
as part of the scheme, and the settlement grew and prospered.30 By 2013, the mainland had become 
the main population centre in the county of Lamu – though the island town of Lamu, a much older 
settlement, was still the county headquarters.31  This process generated multiple tensions – both 
over the land itself, which some local people felt was theirs, and over the sense among those who 
considered themselves coast people that they were being displaced by immigrants from up-country. 
Plans to develop a new port in Lamu County, and a pipeline and other infrastructure, increased 
tensions over land; there have been multiple accusations and counter-accusations of land-
grabbing.32 Pastoralists – who happen to be Muslim - have complained that ‘tycoons’ are fencing off 
their grazing land.33 Not all the ‘coast’ people in Lamu are Muslim; among the relatively newly-
arrived settlers are non-Muslim Mijikenda from elsewhere on the coast. Yet still, the division 
between coast and up-country is easily presented as a Muslim-Christian one. There are, then, 
multiple local drivers of conflict which can be presented as a Muslim struggle against Christian 
oppression – however misleading that presentation may sometimes be.  
 
At the same time, the sense among Kikuyu that they are in danger is the direct result of experience: 
in the 1990s, and again in 2007/8, Kikuyu have been the victims of violence, driven by wider 
resentment and organized by local politicians acting with the apparent support, or at least 
complicity, of national politician. This sense that they are a community under siege helps to explain 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in the 2013 election, in which the turnout from Kikuyu voters was 
phenomenally high.  It also helps to explain why many were so willing to see Raila Odinga as in some 
way implicated in the Mpeketoni attacks. The accusation might be seen as a political device, but 
Kenyatta himself seemed to believe this narrative, and the logic of his argument was revealing:  
The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated and politically motivated ethnic violence 
against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political 
reasons. This, therefore, was not an Al Shabaab terrorist attack.34  
 
The argument is certainly widely accepted among Kikuyu. Ethnic animosity against Kikuyu has been 
common, and is easily mobilised. That sense of siege has driven ever more extraordinary theories of 
conspiracy, with allegations that the US and British governments were funding the violence.35 
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Yet to locate these explanatory narratives as the result of local or national politics begs a question – 
what actually happened? That al-Shabaab have claimed responsibility, and that no one else has, is 
surely significant – yet it may also be significant that the claim of responsibility for the first attack 
was not issued immediately, and that subsequent attacks have been claimed more quickly. It seems 
likely that the group committing these outrages were not in close contact with al Shabaab’s 
leadership before the attack, but that they now are. Al-Shabaab is, as Marchal (2011: 18) has argued, 
a bureaucratic organization. But it is also occasionally prone to internal division, with rival figures 
seeking to establish their credentials – and authority – through their ability to carry out violent 
attacks.36 The attack on Mpeketoni is perhaps in part an assertive statement by one such group; one 
intelligence source reportedly identifies a Kenyan Muslim (somewhat ironically, a Kikuyu by origin) 
as its leader.37 It is surely also significant that these attacks represent a very different kind of 
violence for Islamic radicalism in Kenya: committed at night, by large organized groups with limited 
weaponry and no explosives. It has been argued that Islamic radicals have had difficulty recruiting in 
Kenya – as in Somalia – because their particular interpretations of Islam seemed unsympathetic to 
the local population (Rosenau, 2005: 5; Haynes, 2006: 501; Vittori et al, 2009).  
 
But now al Shabaab makes a deliberate effort to reach a Kenyan audience with messages that have 
little or no doctrinal content; instead they relentlessly advance the argument that Islam is under 
attack. The website SomaliMeMo, closely linked to al Shabaab, now has a Swahili language section, 
which intertwines stories of jihad in Somalia, Syria, Palestine and Kenya.38  While the significance of 
internet publications can be overstated, it is worth noting that the eulogy for Aboud Rogo published 
in Gaidi Mtaani - the internet magazine intended by al-Shabaab to reach a Kenyan audience - evoked 
the name of Abdulaziz Limo, a preacher from the south coast imprisoned in the 1990s for criticizing 
the Kenya government. It also praised the coastal secessionist movement as ‘efforts to return the 
[Islamic] rule which was broken by the English unbelievers’.39 That, and the events in and around 
Mpeketoni, suggest that al-Shabaab – or rather, some who consider themselves to be part of al-
Shabaab - have become ever more interested in playing on the concerns of Kenyan Muslims, and of 
coastal Muslims in particular. As Rabasa (2009: 3) argued ‘[c]onflicts in East Africa can be 
opportunistically exploited by al-Qaeda and associated radical ideologues who seek to represent 
these conflicts as jihads’. It may be this which has allowed the Mpeketoni attackers to mobilise a 
relatively large group, and to secure the degree of local acceptance needed to keep operating. It has 
also allowed them to learn new techniques – whether by observation, or by recruiting some of those 
involved in earlier violence, is unclear.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
35
 ‘Elders blame US/UK and Raila Odinga for Mpeketoni attack’, Daily Post, 18 June 2014, http://www.kenyan-
post.com/2014/06/elders-blame-us-uk-and-raila-odinga-for.html  
36
 ‘Kenyan jihadist resurfaces, sheds light on the current state of al-Shabaab’, Sabahionline, 12 July 2013, 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/07/12/feature-01  
37
 ‘Police unveil names behind Coast killings’, Digital Standard, 13 July 2014, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000127991/police-unveil-names-behind-coast-killings 
viewed 26 July 2014. 
38
 http://somalimemo.net/category/2/Kiswahili viewed 26 July 2014. 
39
 Hassan an Nairobi, ‘Aboud Rogo: Chanzo cha Mabadiliko’, in Gaidi Mtaani, Issue 3, 2013, available at 
http://jihadology.net/2013/03/03/new-issue-of-the-magazine-gaidi-mtaani-issue-3/ viewed 26 July 2014. 
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Conclusion 
 
The attacks on Mpeketoni, and in the area around it, apparently represent an alarming intersection 
of different strands of violence, and different drivers of conflict. To seek an absolutely exclusive 
categorisation of the violence – as solely al-Shabaab or as ‘MRC’, or as the work of national 
politicians – is probably mistaken. The language in which the attackers claimed responsibility 
blended coastal concerns over land with an evocation of Somali sovereignty and also an assertion of 
the need to defend Islam. The sense that Islam is under attack, and that local grievances can be 
understood as part of a universal experience of Muslims has become widely established. At the same 
time, the very nature of the violence is rooted in the Kenyan politics of the last two decades, in 
which organized violence against civilians, mobilised on ethnic lines, has become normalized and has 
gone unpunished. In the process it has eroded the credibility and the competence of the security 
forces. The complicity of national politicians in the mobilization of ethnic violence has made Kenya 
very vulnerable; so too has the erosion of the capabilities and credibility of the security forces. This 
violence is the consequences of that, and of the profound inequalities of Kenya’s political system, as 
much as of international Islamic radicalism. Those who are involved in the violence have pulled these 
multiple strands together. This interweaving is not entirely new; it has long been rumoured that 
some of the young men who went to Somalia in the early 2000s had been among those trained at 
kaya Bombo. But this time the strands have come together with even more effect. 
 
There are, of course, limits to the possibility of this strategy. Kenyan Muslims are not united, and nor 
is the coast. Race and ethnicity, as well as religious differences, divide these potential communities. 
No individual or body has ever succeeded in laying even a modestly plausible claim to speak for 
either, and there is no likelihood that those committing the current violence will be able to mobilise 
all coastal people, or all Muslims. This cannot become a popular mass movement. But as Shinn 
(2207: 67) has noted, ‘It requires only a handful of operatives and a receptive environment to 
conduct successful terrorist activity’. And the attacks at Mpeketoni have already succeeded in 
dramatically increasing tensions: between Muslims and other Kenyans, between coast people and 
other Kenyans, and between Kikuyu and other Kenyans.  
 
The dangerous confusion which this creates  was emphasised again in July 2014, when hooded 
attackers shot and killed several people in the Mombasa suburb of Likoni. They reportedly left 
leaflets announcing that this was ‘revenge’ for Mpeketoni and that their targets were Luo, members 
of the same ethnic group as opposition leader Raila Odinga.40  Al-Shabaab did not claim the attack, 
though SomaliMeMo carried an oddly worded story which apparently referred to the attackers as 
‘Mujahidin’. The senior central government official in Mombasa then publicly alleged that the attack 
was actually the work of Raila’s own party, ODM – a statement immediately denounced by ODM, 
and criticized in the national press.41 The attack itself was perhaps unsurprising: that it was 
                                                          
40
 ‘Deaths in Mombasa shooting rampage’, Al-Jazeera, 21 July 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/07/deaths-shooting-rampage-kenya-mombasa-
20147214444141458.html, viewed 26 July 2014.  
41
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wajitokeza-wazi-wakiwa-na-silaha-zao-na-kufanya-patroo, viewed 26 July 2014; ‘ODM furious over Likoni 
terror link’, The Star, 26 July 2014, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-179948/odm-furious-over-likoni-
terror-link viewed 26 July 2014; ‘State playing politics with security matters’, Editorial, Daily Nation, 26 July 
2014, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Editorial/-State-playing-politics-with-security-matters-/-
/440804/2398030/-/rx80c6/-/index.html, viewed 26 July 2014. 
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immediately the subject of such widely differing interpretations and allegations is further evidence 
that multiple strands of violence interweave on Kenya’s coast, that they are close to running out of 
control - and that the credibility of the state is deeply compromised. It is an alarming situation. 
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